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Abstract Banking prudence and efficiency to manage their risks in different business
cycle and environment would help to alleviate crises and losses. Hence, the effective
assessment of credit risk is an essential component of a comprehensive technique to credit
risk assessment and critical to the long-run of not only banking institutions but also the
economy as a whole. Therefore, it has received a great interest from scholars across
finance and economics to investigate such assessments by banks in different countries
using diverse theoretical underpinnings and methodologies. Hence, this paper is devel-
oped to review analytical conceptualisations of credit risks assessments that have been
developed in the academic literature. By means of a systematic review, it provides a
comprehensive analysis that encompasses approaches used in research papers. There has
been no prior review on analytical conceptualisations in this area.Moreover, this review is
done in a systematic manner, i.e. categorising journal articles into different categories such
as purposes, perspectives and methodologies through a transparent and thorough process.
Thus, it will be able to provide an objective review. Finally, the paper will outline the
evolution of methodologies and theoretical underpinnings in credit risk management
research and a landscape for possible future research directions.
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1 Introduction
‘Over the past two decades, the financial world has evolved from [a] return
driven to a genuine risk management industry. The term risk management
certainly is not confined to what is best denoted with risk control: Measuring




1 University of Bedfordshire, Bedfordshire, UK
risks, setting limits and ensuring adherence to these limits. This is necessarily
part of the whole process of risk-return optimisation…. Risk management… also
compromises the decision making process of considering risk-return trade-offs
and optimising stakeholders’ targets …‘. (Kocken 2006)
& The basic risk factors relevant to financial institutions can be broadly classified into
market risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, underwriting risk, and operational risk.
Therefore, the definition for ‘risk management’ is broad. Banks are exposed to
credit risks more than any other risks mentioned above. Hence, this paper will only
focus on Credit Risk Management (CRM) and Credit Risk Assessments (CRA).
Credit risk can simply be defined as the prospective that a bank borrower or
counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms and
conditions. The failure to manage credit risks properly could result in more than direct
accounting loss. It encompasses opportunity costs, transaction costs and expenses
associated with non-performing asset over and above the accounting loss. It can affect
banks’ portfolio, thereby attracting liquidity risk and in the worst cases, it can have
negative effects on both financial industries and economies. Hence, CRM is understood
as a process that starts from regulatory level, second, from banks’ strategic levels, then
continues to the operational levels. By referring back to Horneff’s (2006) statement as
provided above, this indicates that every level comprises of decision making process,
considering risk-return trade-offs and optimising stakeholders’ targets.
In addition, with the repeated banking crises over the years due to poor CRM by
banks and other financial institutions, this area has received a lot of attention from
academics and many research papers have been published in this area. However, the
conceptions of risk by these researchers can differ significantly. The bulk of
investment-banking oriented body of literature on risk management usually defines
risk in an objective way not differentiating according to the needs of different investors
or stakeholders. On the other hand, there are researchers who consider it to be ‘relative’
rather than an absolute concept (Balzer 1994). This has caused two main concerns.
Firstly, due to such differences, there are inconsistencies in conceptualisations of CRA.
This led to an impediment of a precise academic debate in the field, thereby; hindering
discovery of possible solutions for CRM. Secondly, the extent of such
conceptualisations fails to incorporate the current needs to accommodate the perspec-
tives of a wide range of actors (e.g. decision making at different institutional levels).
More importantly, a lack of a review on conceptualisations of CRA provides the fact
that there is a scope of development in this field of research.
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to illustrate, to compare, and to review
analytical conceptualisations of CRA along with scope of study, analytical domains
and methodologies that have been developed in the academic literature. As my aim is to
provide a comprehensive and systematic review, the analysis encompasses published
research papers from journals. In summary, this study will contribute to banking
literature, especially CRA research. As this is a systematic review conducted according
to the guidelines by Tranfield et al. (2003), the review follows a transparent and
thorough process aimed at enhancing scientific rigor and at developing a reliable stock
of knowledge.
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the concept
of ‘rationality’ in CRM literature. The research design is outlined in Section 3, followed
by the results of our exploratory study. In section 5, analysis and evaluation of
analytical conceptualisations of CRAwill be provided.
2 Rationality assumptions in CRM literature
The term rationality is defined by Bazerman and Messick (1998, p. 478) as.
‘…the decision-making process that is logically expected to deal to the optimal result
given an accurate assessment of the decision-makers’ values and risk preferences’.
In other words, decision makers who are rational will arrive at objective and logical
judgements. In fact, the costs associated with gathering complete information is high or
impossible, making rational decision is implausible. Moreover, rational decisions tend
to be made based on unrealistic assumptions (Robbins and Coulter 2011):
& the problem is clear and unambiguous where decision makers have complete
information;
& the decision is single, well-defined goal that the decision maker is trying to achieve
and there is no conflict over the goal;
& the decision maker can identify relevant criteria, lists all the viable alternatives, and
is aware of all possible consequences of each alternative;
& the decision maker can obtain full information about the criteria and alternatives
because it is assumed to that there are no time or cost constraints; and
& the rational decision maker always chooses the alternative that will yield the
maximum payoff
In CRA, it is not about solving a problem but contemplating whether to take an
opportunity for return to realise in the future from investment. These opportunities come
with uncertainties and it is impossible for banks to have complete information. Similarly,
the full information about the consequences, in this case, borrowers engaging in risky
activities cannot be obtained. Herne (2011) finds some evidence showing that individual
choices disappear when individuals have an opportunity to learn and correct their choices
to bemore in line with the standard utility model depending on the situation where decision
making takes place, thereby concluding that different institutional structure affect such
differing preferences. Similarly, the studies also find that the standard utility model works
well in certain types of competitive markets but not in other institutional environments.
These are the results of individuals’ limited cognitive capabilities, information processing
capacity, time and cost constraints on decision makers to obtain complete information. In
other words, optimal ‘risk perception’ is not attainable. Thus, the term ‘bounded rationality’
is created by Simon (1976, p.82) stating that
‘The human being striving for rationality and restricted within the limits of his
knowledge has developed some working procedures that partially overcome these
difficulties. These procedures consist in assuming that he can isolate from the rest
of the world a closed system containing a limited number of variables and a
limited range of consequences’
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& He further asserts that due to these limitations, individuals construct simpli-
fied models of the real world in order to deal with it. He refers to it as
picking a course of action that is satisfactory, ‘satisficing’ or ‘good enough’
under circumstances. Applying his views on banks’ CRA context, collat-
erals, interest rates, for example, are used by banks to simplify complicated
issues of deciding whether to approve or reject loan applications. In devel-
oped countries, the over reliance on credit rating agencies is also the result
of banks’ attempts to simplify complex processes. Similar to Herne (2011),
Simon (1976) also states that it is impossible for individuals to analyse
logically and dispassionately to make the best possible decision as they are
constrained within the realm of cultural, organisational or their own values.
Banking is one of the most regulated industries in the world, among various
regulatory measures, the regulation of bank capital is crucial due to the
important roles it plays in banks’ soundness and risk taking behaviour and its
influence on the competitiveness of banks (Zhu 2008). Therefore, different
types of regulatory frameworks have been introduced for internationally active
banks to follow. For instance, at the international level, in 1988, Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) formed Basel Accord I. According to
this, bank loans of different risk have same weight which allows banks to swap
low risk assets with high risk ones. In other words, this Basel Accord allows
regulatory arbitrage (Zhu 2008). Then, in 2004, Basel II which is a revised
version of the former one was released. It allows banks to compute the capital
requirements for managing credit risks, standardised approach, Foundation In-
ternal Ratings-Based approach (FIRB) and Internal Ratings-Based approach
(IRB). In order to use the latter approaches, it needs approvals from regulatory
authorities (regulatory level) and is costly; therefore, banks opt to use the
former approach which relies on external rating agencies. In this case, the
effects of institutions and environments on credit risk measurements come from
two directions, one from external rating agencies and another from the banks
themselves. During the times of economic and financial crises, these rating
agencies downgrade credit risks including sovereign debts. At the same time,
banks become more cautious in lending which creates two directional influences
in changing banks’ credit risks perceptions.
In addition, the effects of those institutional constraints cannot be ignored if
we take into account of countries that have implemented Basel Accords and
those that have not. Even those countries that have implemented the same Basel
Accord also tend to have different approaches in their lending practices, for
instance UK and Germany (Lane and Quack 2001). If the decision makings
was rational, we would not have financial crises and banks would not be
accused of irresponsible lending. Therefore, the statement which states that
rationality exists becomes questionable.
Similar to other decision making research papers, researchers of banking and
finance communities are interested in understanding why people make the
choices and judgments that they do, for example, the reasons for inflicting
higher interest rates on one group of borrowers and lower interest on the
another, and why banks refuse to lend to small businesses. Though banks’
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CRA process has been discussed in the previous section, the question of
whether decision makers are rational, that is what makes to choose one
alternative over another still remains unanswered. Many researchers have dif-
ferent opinions on whether to conduct research based on ‘rationality’ assump-
tions. Hence, an exploratory study of previous literature is conducted to learn
about analytical conceptualisations of CRA in banking literature.
3 Research design
Due to the origins of credit risk, I focused primarily on banking academics and
literature in order to contribute to the field by systematically reviewing the
relevant literature. Three primary sources that I used to collect journal articles
are EBSCO/Business Source Complete, PROQUEST and Emerald. This review
followed the guidelines proposed by Tranfield et al. (2003). Prior to conducting




In the recent years, due to the banking crises and other financial sector collapses, the field
of banks’ credit risk management and assessments has experienced a new dynamics in
terms of proposing various new analytical conceptualisations of such assessments.
Different attempts have been made to improve and to overcome existing inconsistencies
in this field of research. The fact that the literature has not yet provided a review of past
research demonstrates that there has been a lack of collaborations among the researchers
to improve analytical conceptualisations of credit risk assessments.
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to illustrate and to evaluate analytical conceptualisations
of credit risk assessments that have been developed in the academic literature.
Research
Questions
What are the analytical foundations used in CRA research and their assumptions in terms
of rationality?
What are analytical domains found in CRA research?
What are the prominent methodologies used in the area of research?
What are the gaps and future research directions?
Sample The sample consists on published papers focusing on CRA in banks aimed at making a
contribution to the conceptualisations of CRA.
Search Strategy • Journals are identified through ABS journal ranking guide
• Keywords such as ‘Credit Risk Assessment’, ‘Credit Risk Management’, ‘Banks’
Lending Behaviour’ and ‘Banks’ Lending Practices’ were used to identify the papers on
EBSCO/Business Source Premier, Emerald and Proquest
4 Results
Due to the vast amount of literature in this area and based on the theoretical
underpinnings, literature gaps are divided into two, one based on the perspec-
tives used by the researchers to study risk perceptions and banks’ lending, i.e.
where CRA is viewed as either rationalised or institutionalised; and analytical
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domains, where different levels of factors affecting lending decisions are
researched upon. The summary can be presented as in Fig. 1.
4.1 Perspectives
Research on risk in decision making has been dominated by statistical estimations
which are often inadequate to alleviate people’s attitudes toward risks (Renn and
Swaton 1984). Such methodologies are designed to be objective. However, they lack
interpretability of results as they do not take into account of public perceptions and
social effects. Since risk is not an Bobjective^ fact in the business environment
(Luhmann 1993), studying risk perceptions by banks using probability calculus will
not allow us to understand the factors influencing banks’ lending behaviour (Lane and
Quack 2001). In general, this type of methodology fails to include bounded rationality
and subjective rationality in various estimations process. Thompson (1967) supports
this fact by stating that uncertainties and risk pose major challenges to rationality which
is manifested itself in an individual’s perception. To bridge this gap, many researchers
have taken different perspectives such as sociological and psychological to study risk in
different areas of research such as in foreign direct investment (Francis et al. 2009),
information systems (Tsohou et al. 1993), organisational communication (Lammers and
Barbour 2006) and so on. According to Renn and Swaton (1984), these perspectives of
risk in decision making are divided into four categories:



















   
   
   
   
   
   






   
   




Fig. 1 Graphical presentation of literature gaps
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1) Classical Decision Analysis – focuses on rationality of decision making process
and what motivational and cognitive biases are incorporated to optimise our own
judgement.
2) Psychological Decision Theory – emphasises individuals’ processes of information
about risk and logical structure in arriving at an overall judgement.
3) Social-psychological Judgement and Attitude Theory – concentrates on the inter-
action between social values and personal judgement.
4) Sociological Theories and Policy Analysis – investigates the social goals, values,
or motives that drive persons and social groups to come to final judgement.
4.1.1 Classical decision theory
Classical decision theory assumes that individuals are rational decision makers and
optimise their judgements through formal axioms. Grandori (1984) asserts that classical
decision theory incorporates an optimising model. In other words, these theories match
the decision processes with a normative model of rational reasoning thereby maximising
utility of individuals or groups (Renn and Swaton 1984). Oliveira (2007) used the term
‘normative’ or ‘rational’ decision theories to describe this process. In rational decision
makingmodels, a number of possible alternatives from different scenarios are analysed by
decisionmakers before making a final choice which would have the highest probability of
outcome in the best expected scenario (Oliveira 2007). Therefore, most of the research
papers using classical decision or normative theories seek to understand how decision
makers solve problems through identifying different alternatives. Banks’ decision making
processes have been studied by economists emphasising ‘markets with imperfect infor-
mation’, ‘bounded rationality of decision-makers’, ‘moral hazard’ and ‘adverse selection’
(Stiglitz andWeiss 1981). Some of the economic theories that are used to employ rational
decision making models are expected utility theory and game theory.
Economic theory, for example, limits its attention to goods, bonds and money as
long as the institutionalisation of saving and investment is confined to the monetary
system (Gurley and Shaw 1955). Its methodology involves rational decision making
models that follow three steps process of (1) analysing the feasibility of the alternative,
(2) pondering the desirability of alternative, and (3) choosing the best alternative by
combining both desirability and feasibility (Rubinstein 1998). Grandori (1984) states
that in the economic theory of competitive decision, the payoff structure is considered
as ‘known’ until a system of information, the price system is there to reflect the
influence of all the relevant factors. In reality, competitive equilibrium cannot be
achieved as said in economic theory at least in banks’ lending because of the use of
non-interest item, for instance, collateral is used to offset asymmetry of information
existing between the lender and borrower. Moreover, the lenders are unaware of the
default probabilities of the borrowers, therefore, are unable to rank and choose the
feasible and desirable alternatives. If the lenders were able to rank default probabilities
of borrowers using their credit ratings and collaterals, nonetheless, the information is
ex-ante and cannot determine the occurrence of moral hazard.
Economic theory has been used to study banks’ lending by Stiglitz andWeiss (1981).
Their study has been the most influential in banks’ lending studies (Wette 1983;
Besankor and Thakor 1987; De Meza and Webb 1987; Arnold and Rile 2009; Su
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2010). Their main idea is that in a competitive equilibrium, a loan market is
characterised by credit rationing. In their model, banks categorise borrowers according
to the expected return of projects. It shows that if a bank increases its interest rates
charged on borrowers, it will suffer from adverse selection as only risky borrowers are
willing to borrow at such high rate and cause moral hazard as they would choose riskier
projects. Therefore, interest rate being charged on the borrower is sensitive to banks’ risk
ranking of them according to the repayment probabilities. They also examined the role
of collaterals but only for risk-averse borrowers. This argument has been further
extended by Wette (1983), however, only for risk-neutral borrowers and focuses on
collateral requirement while interest rate is held fixed. Thus, in these types of models of
studying banks’ lending behaviour, borrowers’ risk classes are first sorted. These
assumptions and results led to conclude that lower quality borrowers could only be
attracted at higher interest rates and collateral requirements. In these types of study,
different decision makers would arrive at the same conclusion which in reality is not the
case, because their experiences, intuitions and the institutional environments that they
operate in also have significant influences on how they make judgments.
It is true that classical decision theory and rational decision making models are the
most reliable and robust for describing and predicting aggregate-level outcomes that are
the result of individual level decisions especially with the case in situations where
monetary markets, where information regarding preferences are readily available (Cook
et al. 1990). North (1990, p.11) also argues that classical theories are compatible with
and have made major contributions to market analyses in developed countries but fail
to characterise underdeveloped markets.
Other limitations also exist. Firstly, they assume that a clear distinction can be made
between high and low risk borrowers. Secondly, almost all the research papers using
classical decision theory to study decision making lack empirical testing of the under-
lying assumptions. Most importantly, the simplifying approach of classical decision
theory does not capture the complexities of national and organisational environmental
effects on the variations in risk assessments. Thus, classical decision theories with over
emphasis on an individual level of analysis should be avoided.
4.1.2 Psychological decision theory
While economic literature on loan officers assumes that they are fully rational people,
making decisions on the base of real, although information concerning the quality of
applicants and their investment projects are not verifiable, psychological decision theory
recognises the role of individuals in arriving judgements. Their personalities and percep-
tions, roles and organisations including their values and emotions can affect their decision
making styles. Psychological decision theory gives emphasis on individual process of
reasoning while incorporating the social desirability of perceived consequences and
specific motivational factors in processing risk and uncertainties leading to the formation
of an overall judgement (Renn and Swaton 1984; Mcnamara and Bromiley 1997). Thus,
embodiment of ‘bounded rationality’ concept into economic organisations has
revolutionised economists from a fully rational model of decision making (Rakow
2010). Game theory, prospect theory, attribution theory and theory of choice are the most
common theoretical assumptions used in psychological decision-making models
(Oliveira 2007). In addition, researchers have also integrated psychological-based theories
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to study investors’ behaviour in financial decision making process. In these types of
behavioural finance models, traditional assumptions of individual rationality hypothesis
are relaxed and agents’ cognitive psychology is examined.
With the introduction of game theory in classical decision making models, psycho-
logical aspect of decision making can be seen. For instance, Barboza (2009) uses game
theory approach to study micro lending with no physical collateral but social cost that acts
as a quasi-collateral. In that study, the interplay of trust between lender, borrower and
consignors is examined. In a regular market setting, using collateral to overcome asym-
metry of information would be the dominant strategy and if the borrower is unable to
provide such collaterals, the bankwould refuse granting the loan. However, in microcredit
setting, group-based individual lending contracts where if a person defaults, the other
group members would need to pay off the balance owing to the lender, preventing moral
hazard by the borrowers. Under this condition, joint liability among borrowers are created,
therefore, only those borrowers which the group could trust would get loans, thereby
decreasing asymmetry of information. In this study, strategic interaction among
uncollateralised borrowers has been introduced into rational decision making model.
However, it does not describe the complexity of different levels of political, social and
cultural relationships. Another limitation in this study is that though it incorporates
psychological thinking, it does not omit the assumptions of rational choice theory.
Rational decision making models and economic applications of banks’ lending studies
can also be seen using game theory which introduces strategic behaviour into rational
decision theories. It focuses on interdependent decision making process (Shubik et al.
2002). The underlying assumption is that decision makers take into account of other
people’s solutions before choosing an alternative. Jeong and Joh (2010) study banks’ risk
taking behaviour using a game theory framework. They study Korean commercial banks
using quarterly data on bank lending compiled by the Bank of Korea from 1993 to 2008.
Their results show that big banks tend to takemore risks by lending to high risk borrowers
as they receive government protections through bail-outs and deposit insurances.
Researchers studying decision making from psychological perspectives are interest-
ed in the role of intuitions and emotions in arriving a judgement (Agor 1984; Klein
2003). Intuition is regarded as Bvague feeling of knowing something without knowing
exactly how or why^ (Hayashi 2001; Lipshitz and Shulimovitz 2007). Emotion, on the
other hand, is defined as the feelings of impending decision might be wrong, or that
particular decision is inappropriate (Lipshitz and Shulimovitz 2007). The effects of
intuition and emotion, in other words, behavioural factors, on banks’ lending decisions
are widely studied (Jankowicz and HISRICH 1987; Lipshitz and Shulimovitz 2007;
Bellucci et al. 2010; Hensman and Sadler-Smith 2011). Jankowicz and Hisrich (1987)
use personal construct theory to explore intuitive factors of banks’ loan officers in small
business loan decisions. Their sample includes 20 commercial loan officers from four
banks in Tulsa, Oklahom, and Las Cruces, New Mexico. Their results indicate that
intuition of loan officers plays more important role in business lending than collateral
and other financial aspects of a prospective loan.
Prospect theory, for example, is first introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
then, it is advanced into cumulative prospect theory by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
It insists that risk attitude is determined by the outcome’s relation to subjective
judgement and not the level of outcome. According to prospect theory, individuals
tend to be risk averse in a domain of gains or when the circumstances are in favour of
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them, and risk seeking in a domain of losses or when they are in the midst of crisis. It
has been used by Godlewski (2007) to study risk-taking behaviour by banks in
emerging markets. The author has used accounting data of 894 South-East Asian and
South and Latin American banks for the period of 1996–2001 from Bankscope
database. The results support prospect theory’s assumptions. Johnson (1993) has also
found similar results using 142 banks’ data from Bank Compustat for the period of
1979–1989. These types of study over emphasise individuals’ cognitive processes. It
fails to take into account of the institutional constraints such as regulatory requirements
on the banks. When these types of constraints exist, even if the loan officers have all the
information they need to validate the credibility of the borrower, loan applications
might be rejected as to institutional limitations.
Psychological studies are oriented towards individual decision making and more or
less assumed that people are rational when making economic decisions. This approach
has been further improved by not only focusing on individual (micro) level but also on
how societal (macro) level affects individual choice in social-psychological judgement
theory. This is discussed in detail in the next section.
4.1.3 Social-psychological judgement and attitude theory (Sociocognitive)
Social-psychological study of risk perception is interested in the issues of risk com-
munications and also termed as ‘empiricist psychometric’ approach (Taylor-Gooby and
Zinn 2006). The studies of risk perceptions using social-psychological judgement
theory assumes that risk is defined subjectively and influenced by psychological, social,
institutional and cultural factors (Solvic 2001). In other words, psychological based
studies focused only on intuition, personalities, emotions and perceptions, however, in
social psychology, it is interested in knowing how social factors influence those
psychological aspects and final judgements are arrived. McNamara and Bromiley
(1997) studied influences on risk assessment in commercial lending using behaviour
decision theories by recognising organisational and cognitive factors.
Bellucci et al. (2010) provide a review of literature and examined the theoretical
arguments and empirical evidence on how genders of loan officers have effects on
banks’ lending practices. They have summarised that male and female loan officers’
exhibit different risk tolerance levels. This can be the results of other factors such as
differences in response to incentives (Agarwal and Wang 2008; Beck et al. 2009) and
career concerns (Agarwal and Wang 2008).
Risk studies based on psychometric perspective use quantitative measures including
questionnaire studies, magnitude estimation, numerical scaling, and attitude surveys
(Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2006). Other associated methodologies include Logit Model
(Agarwal andWang 2008; Barasinska 2009), Probit Model (Ravina 2008; Bellucci et al.
2009), Tobit Model (Ravina 2008) and qualitative methodologies such as interviews, are
also used in association with quantitative measures (Buttner and Rosen 1988).
4.1.4 Sociological theories and policy analysis
By only depending on the behavioural data alone limits the importance of social
context of choice (Cook et al. 1990). In other words, rational decision makers in a
particular social context will not be able to make rational decisions as collection
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preferences cannot be obtained due to the constraints imposed from the contextual
environment. Sociological perspective gives a distinctive contribution to risk analysis
as its emphasis is on the role of shared ideas and normative frameworks which are
formed by cultural and social factors (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2006). Douglas and
Wildvasky (1982) have studied risk from sociocultural perspective. They have found a
wide range of cultural bases for risk perception and the process of dealing with it. Thus,
sociological perspective gives a significant contribution to classical risk studies whose
assumptions are that individuals are rational actors.
However, sociological theories have not been incorporated extensively in studying
banks’ lending behaviour, except for Lane and Quack (2002) who applied sociological
institutionalist approach to understand how banks construct and manage risk in SME
lending. The authors analysed banks financing in Britain and Germany and found
different approach towards risk assessments despite banks are within EU regulations
and internationalisation. This is because banks are deeply embedded in their own
institutional framework.
Moreover, Lane and Quack (2002) investigate countries in which economic sanc-
tions do not exist, therefore, with no barriers to internationalisation. By looking at this
study, differences in banks’ lending practices can be seen across two different countries.
If the banks are considered to be rational, no difference will be seen. Hence, banks’
operations and activities are affected by the institutional environment where they
operate in (Hernández-Cánovas and Koëter-Kant 2010). Therefore, there requires the
need to take into account of the context. By referring back to the theoretical studies of
perception of risks, sociological theory would be the only one that addresses power,
institutional constraints, social values and pressure groups on risk perception (Otway
and Vonwinterfeldt 1982).
Thus, in order to understand banks’ risk assessment procedures and policies, it is
necessary to consider the institutional environment in which the banks are embedded
in. This includes regulative effects of state policy, legislation and intermediary organi-
sations on banks’ lending behaviour which have been highlighted by some of the
comparative studies of economic organisation in different societies (Lane and Quack
2002; Klein 2003; Whitley 2003) and other normative and cognitive effects as sug-
gested by new institutional theory (Dimaggio and Powell 1983; Scott and Meyer 1994).
4.2 Analytical domains
Previous studies’ analytical domains are divided into three different levels of practice in
sociology, micro, meso and macro levels.
4.2.1 Micro level
The studies in which individual interactions between and within organisations, thus
having direct effects on decision making processes will be classified under micro level
studies. For instance, Deyoung et al. (1999) study the effects of age, number of
branches and size of the bank on banks’ lending using US commercial bank data and
find that there are negative relationships between age and size of the banks on lending
to small businesses. They have also found that banks with higher concentration of
banks’ branches in urban market have positive effect on small business lending. Similar
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results are also found by Berger et al. (2001) and Zhong and Ying (2009) stating that
large banks are less likely to engage in small business lending and this is also true for
distressed and foreign owned banks in Argentina and China respectively.
Panagopoulos and Spiliotis (1998) and Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) study the
customer relationships and their effects on pledging collaterals and interest rates. The
former uses bank level data set from Greek banks whereas the latter from Belgian
banks. However, they have got the same results suggesting that the longer the
customers have relationships with a bank, the lower the interest rates and probability
of pledging collaterals. Sapienza (2004) and Micco and Panizz (2006) study the impact
of bank ownership on banks’ lending. They have found that government-owned banks
charge lower interest rates than private banks. Similarly, higher risk takings can be
found in shareholder owned banks as they attempt to increase shareholders’ wealth
(Seabright et al. 2002). These studies have used data from European transition coun-
tries. There is also another study of the relationships between internal credit ratings
which is derived from Basel Accord II and interest premiums (Machauer and Weber
1998). This study focuses on German banks and finds that loan interest premiums are
related to borrower credit ratings and show no relation to collaterals.
In summary, these micro level studies focus on the organisational factors such as
customers, collaterals, bank size, ownership, age and number of branches and their
effects on banks’ lending behaviour.
4.2.2 Meso level
Meso level studies are broader than micro level studies in the sense that they provide
more focus on industrial effects on banks’ lending practices. One of the most studied
meso level factors and its effects on banks’ lending is competition. There are signifi-
cance number of studies stating that competition not only decreases cost of borrowing
but also increases banks to have longer relationships with borrowers (Petersen and
Rajan 1995; Ruckes 2004; Hauswald and Marquez 2006; Zhong and Ying 2009),
thereby creating less incentives for banks to acquire information. Liu et al. (2012) study
competition and risk taking in regard to South East Asian banking. They have found
that concentration of banks lead to reduce risk taking. The major flaw of the study is
that they have studied only four countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines
and Vietnam, which are listed under top six economies according to GDP data from
IMF database. They have generalised the findings based on these four countries and
concluded that competition decreases banks’ risk taking behaviour. Collateral laws and
creditor protection rights are also found to have effects on banks’ lending, for instance,
Haselmann and Wachtel (2006) study 423 banks in 20 transition countries in Europe
and found that banks in good legal environment is associated with banks acceptance of
different types of assets as collaterals and these banks are more willing to lend to
information opaque borrowers.
Ely and Robinson (2001) also study the improved in credit scoring models in
banking industry and its effects on banking industry using US banking data. They
have discovered that technological change in credit scoring increases large banks’ share
of small business lending and decreases average loan size to small businesses. The
impacts of capital regulations on banks’ lending are also studied quite extensively by
many researchers (Ben Naceur and Kandil 2009; Shrieves and Dahl 1995; Honda 2004;
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Yilmaz 2009). They have found that regulatory practices, capital regulation and bank
penalties have significant effects on banks’ lending.
In summary, meso level studies focus on the relationships between competitions,
collateral laws, and technological developments in banking sector, capital regulations
and banks’ lending behaviour.
4.2.3 Macro level
Macro level studies are the broadest of all as it takes into account of all the factors that not
only affect banking industry as such but the economy as a whole. These studies include
macroeconomic uncertainties, socio-cultural environment, and so on. For instance, Baum
et al. (2002) and Ruckes (2004) study of macroeconomic uncertainties such as uncertainty
in future economic conditions, inflation, and volatility of interest rates on banks’ lending
and found that banks become collectively more conservative in lending when there are a
lot of pressures of macroeconomic uncertainties using bank level data from US. Similar
results are found in Italian (Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2003) and.
Chilean banks (Micco and Panizz 2006). On the other hand, Maznevski et al. (2001)
have taken a different perspective by studying banks’ lending behaviour from social-
cultural environmental perspective. They have used comparative data on cultural
orientations from Canada, Mexico, Netherlands, Taiwan and USA integrating behav-
ioural finance approach to understand how the differences in social cultural environ-
ment can have an effect on banks’ lending practices. Their results indicate that loans are
best rated when hierarchical information about the borrowers is given and worst when
collective information is given.
It can be concluded that all of these papers study banks’ lending by either isolating
analytical domains or considering decision making as being rational or at least within
bounded rational by using quantitative methodologies. In other words, many of the
research papers in this area usually isolate the factors by studying only one directional
approach rather than the interconnectedness and reflective actions on influences. In
addition, none of these studies undertake research on how banks respond to institutional
environment and how they interact with each other in order to attain efficiency while
achieving legitimacy. Different levels of studies provide different factors affecting banks’
lending behaviour. In reality, not only banks’ lending but also their other activities operate
by interacting with the elements from both task and institutional environments.
Moreover, it is unrealistic to study risk perceptions only at an individual level and
also, it is inappropriate to assume that individuals are rational. The studies with
rationality assumption are weak in the sense it will not give complete picture of the
phenomenon in how banks’ lending practices are shaped if the events or state of affairs
that materialises them are excluded (Elster 1990). In order to choose one of the risks in
decision making studies for this research, there is the need to understand the type of
environments that banks operate in. In a country, banking sector receives more policy
attention than any other sectors. This is because they play a dominant role in the
financial system by leveraging their balance sheet structure to allocate financial re-
sources for businesses. This high leverage implies substantial degree of exposure of
capital to liquidity, credit and other risks, which can lead to possible bank runs and
failures. If these happen, there can be disruptive consequences for the economy. As a
result, quantitative (capital adequacy requirements for risk diversification) and
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qualitative (protection rules for stakeholders) prudential regulations are imposed on
banks (Rocha et al. 1999), therefore, banks become highly institutionalised (Soon and
Cummings 1997). In any organisations, in this case, banks operating in the industry
mean they have claimed memberships to related institutions in this industry. Banks as
members need to follow rules and norms in the environment along with the industry to
become legitimate for their existence and survival. Thus, the type of study which
integrates ‘sociological theories and policy analysis’ is more suitable for this research.
To this date, sociological theories have yet to be widely applied in banking research,
except for Lane and Quack (2002) and Riaz (2009). The former studies banks’ lending
behaviour in the UK and Germany while the latter applied sociological approach to
study the global financial crisis. As the research using sociological approach is limited,
there is no prior framework or model to be followed. Therefore, the following chapter
will provide the process by which sociological theories or approaches can be applied in
banking studies.
5 Conclusions
In summary, the literature studying banks’ lending behaviour used statistical probability
models based on bank level data which are only realised in the future and has ignored
the fact that these future results are formed by the banks’ perceptions and risk attitudes
towards businesses during their lending decisions. In other words, these financial
studies focus on market-based judgements of financial risks and the ex-post calibration
of different factors and bank lending. In contrast, bank lending decisions are strategic
decision processes (ex-ante) and made depending on their perceptions of borrower’s
credibility and repayment ability.
Secondly, these studies are limited in the sense that they only identified the signifi-
cances of the relationships between different factors and banks’ lending, and failed to
explore other factors constraining banks from externalising and internalising risks. By
identifying the significances of the relationships, these studies isolate the factors in macro,
meso and micro analyses and fail in one important respect, that is, how these factors
influence one another, in other words, they fail to provide theoretical links in which these
factors interact. More importantly, these analyses are based on the countries where
transparency exists and large amount of data can be gathered through different sources.
Thirdly, most of these studies have ‘rationality’ assumptions in studying decision
making approach. This causes limitations as it usually simplifies complexities of rela-
tionships between political and social relationships. Individual level decision making is
very complex, hence, require an expanded set of concepts about how different institu-
tional arrangements affect and are affected by individual decision making (Cook et al.
1990). Rationality is more concerned with micro level than macro level studies. Miller
(1990, p. 343) also makes distinctions between economics and sociology by stating that
BEconomics is about how individuals make choices, and sociology is about how
individuals have no choices to make. The gap between economics and sociology
has certainly shrunk dramatically as economists have learned to accept the
possibility that individual choices in coordination games are rationally
S. Win
constrained by social conventions and norms. However, individuals in social
settings constrained by social norms still have important choices to make^
& He suggests that there is still a gap in studying banks’ lending behaviour in two
main streams, economic and sociology. Much of the research in banking is dom-
inated by economists who integrate their rationality models into them. Despite
sociological approach being recognised to improve banking studies, none of the
sociologists have taken the steps to integrate their disciplinary assumptions and
theories into this area. It is needed as banks are similar to individuals living in a
community or a society, where they have to adapt to the environments that they live
in and follow the requirements that their societies expected them to. These gaps in
literature give a scope for interdisciplinary approach to study CRA.
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